Can subjective well-being predict unemployment length ? by Mavridis, Dimitris
Policy Research Working Paper 5293




Development Economics Vice Presidency


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5293
This paper uses 16 waves of panel data from the British 
Household Panel Survey to evaluate the role of subjective 
well-being in determining labor market transitions. It 
confirms a previous finding in the literature: individuals 
report a fall in their happiness when they lose a job, but 
they report a smaller fall when they are surrounded by 
unemployed peers, an effect called the “social norm”. 
The main results of interest are that job search effort 
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and unemployment duration are affected by the utility 
differential between having a job and being unemployed. 
Since this differential is also affected by the social 
norm, it implies that when unemployment increases, 
the unemployed are happier and they reduce their 
search effort. These results indicate that unemployment 
hysteresis has labor supply causes. Can Subjective Well-Being Predict Unemployment Duration?
Dimitris Mavridis
This version :May 1, 2010
Junior Professional Associate at DEC-OS, The World Bank. Email : mavridis.dimitris@gmail.com
This paper is a revised and condensed version of my master's thesis at the Paris School of Economics. I
would like to thank Andrew Clark for invaluable supervision and comments.
1Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Literature Review 4
2.1 Subjective Well-Being and Labor Market Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The Social Norm Eect of Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Unemployment Duration and Subjective Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Data Description 7
4 Determinants of Subjective Well-Being 9
4.1 Labor Market Status, Age, Income, Civic Status, Education and Health . . 11
4.2 The Social Norm Eect of Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.1 Theory : a binary choice model with externalities . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.2 Empirical evidence : pooled data regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.3 Empirical evidence : results with panel data specication . . . . . . 16
4.3 A note on the use of Pooled data vs Fixed Eect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.1 Pooled Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.2 Fixed Eects Regressions : individual xed-eects . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 Unemployment Duration 20
5.1 Determinants of duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1.1 Unemployment duration and well-being: how to nd the causality
direction ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 The role of social norms in duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.1 Social norms and duration : empirical evidence from the duration
model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3 Is search intensity related to change in GHQ ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28




8.1 Is the GHQ-12 a good measure of Well-Being? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2 Duration model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.2.1 Cox Proportional Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.3 Regression Results and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
21 Introduction
This paper aims at showing that labor supply decisions are often made taking into account
other's labor supply, due to the existence of strong comparison eects. It also goes one
step further in showing that job search eort is aected by comparisons with others. The
dataset used is the BHPS (British Household Panel Survey). It is a representative sample
of the British population, from which labor market status and a composite measure of
self-reported well-being (to proxy for utility) are used.
Three distinctive results are presented. First, it is shown that upon losing their job,
individuals report a fall in their well-being. This fall is reduced when there are more unem-
ployed in one's comparison group (household and region), referred to as the "Social Norm
Eect", as in Clark (2003). This eect persists in panel data estimations were the unob-
served individual heterogeneity is controlled for. The second nding is that unemployment
duration is aected by this social norm eect. The more an individual reports feeling hurt
when losing his job -(the happiness dierence)- the shortest will be his duration in unem-
ployment. The happiness dierence is a good predictor of the duration of unemployment,
even after controlling for demographic characteristics also aecting duration. The third
result shows that job search eort is itself dependent on the happiness dierence. An indi-
vidual searches with more intensity when he reports a large happiness drop when entering
unemployment.
The implications of these results are twofold. First, they shed light on our understand-
ing of job search eort. The results suggest that search eort is positively dependent on
Ve   Vu, the dierence in well-being an individual reports between being employed and
jobless. As the payo from being employed rises (falls), the unemployed will search more
(less). Second, they provide a labor-supply explanation of unemployment hysteresis. Due
to comparison eects, when an individual loses his job, he feels less bad if there are more
unemployed around him. His utility is hence aected by other's employment status. This
will reduce his search eort and increase his unemployment duration, aecting then the
search behavior of others. In the case of an exogenous macroeconomic shock that reduces
labor demand, our ndings suggest that labor supply will also shift to the left, increasing
unemployment and causing hysteresis.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of
the literature on subjective well-being (SWB henceforth) and labor market status. Section
III describes the 16 waves of the BHPS. Section IV shows the rst results of importance.
It rst presents the determinants of SWB, and then the social norm eect. Both pooled
and panel data specications are explained. Section V introduces the determinants of
unemployment duration and search eort. Section VI concludes.
32 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on subjective well-being (SWB) and labor market status.
It summarizes two main ndings, both relevant for the present thesis. The rst nding is
that individuals' happiness is aected by their employment status. Those who lose their
job feel signicantly worse than when employed, far worse than their income loss would
predict1. The second nding is that aggregate unemployment is also aecting individuals.
There is a so called "Social Norm" eect of unemployment, through which unemployed
feel less hurt the higher the unemployment is in their reference group. Unemployment also
aects those who are employed, although contradictory eects are found in the literature2.
Based on these ndings, this section presents the possibility that the social norm eect
from unemployment might aect the search behaviour and the duration of unemployment.
It then asks what policy questions arise.
2.1 Subjective Well-Being and Labor Market Status
A large stream of research has been interested in the relationship between subjective well-
being and labor market status. The social psychology literature precedes economics in
this eld. The idea conveyed in most of the works is that there are many non-pecuniary
benets from working. Unemployment deprives the former workers from latent functions
such as social interactions, purposefulness, a time structure and a certain construction of
identity (Jahoda, 1982). Hence, unemployed are worse o not just because of the loss of
their wage income3. Earlier empirical work by Jackson, Staord and Warr (1983) shows
that well-being rises with the transition from unemployment to paid work. Although the
sample used is not representative of the population, it is useful at highlighting the eect
of transitions on happiness. Darity and Goldsmith (1996) provide an extensive summary
of the social psychology literature on unemployment.
Empirical work from economists testing this view has been conducted since the early
1990s, when data on SWB became available through national household surveys includ-
ing a section on well-being. Clark and Oswald (1994) use the rst wave of the BHPS to
nd that unemployed are, on a raw average, half as happy as the employed. This result
is corroborated by the studies of Korpi (1997), who uses Swedish data, Winkelmann and
Winkelmann (1998), who use the German GSOEP, Woittiez and Theeuves (1998) who have
Dutch data, and Frey and Stutzer (2000) who use a Swiss household survey. Data on other
countries have also been available through the World Values Surveys (WVS) and through
1Clark (1998) nds that the income loss from losing a job explains only a quarter of the drop in well-being
2Di Tella et al, (2001) nd that unemployment negatively aects SWB (in developed countries), whereas
Eggers et al (2006) nd a positive eect using Russian data.
3Proponents of this idea highlight the negative psychological impact of being unemployed. Summaries of
the literature can be found in Fryer and Payne (1986), Warr et al (1988), Feather (1990), Burchell (1992),
Murphy and Athanasou (1999). Argyle (1989) is a reference book in social psychology with an extensive
chapter on the GHQ measure and another one on unemployment
4other European studies such as the ones used by Blanch
ower (1996) and Di Tella (2001).
What all these studies have in common is the result of lower levels of well-being for the
unemployed.
A reverse causality issue can arise if one is limited to cross section data, as it might be
easier for happy people to nd a job. If inherently happy people are also more productive,
better at work or simply more desirable to employers, then it is happiness that positively
in
uences the chances of nding a job, and not the reverse. One way to isolate the causal
impact is to use panel data and observe what happens to individuals' happiness as they
change status. This identication strategy is followed in this paper, and the panel data
evidence on labor market transitions proves that the causality goes from labor status to
happiness rather than the other way around.
2.2 The Social Norm Eect of Unemployment
Individuals are aected by their employment status, but also by others' employment. Di
Tella et al (2001) are among the rst to test the impact of aggregate unemployment on
individual's well-being. They nd that people have a preference for lower levels of aggre-
gate unemployment. Their results, to be interpreted in a context of a trade-o between
in
ation and unemployment (a Phillips curve), show that individuals are also hurt by in-

ation although its eects are much lower. The nding is consistent with the literature on
happiness in the sense that it provides evidence of strong comparison eects.
The classical analysis of Akerlof (1980) has been instrumental in the way economists
think about social norms, their sustainability and their eect on individual's behavior. In
his model, a social norm precluding transactions at the market-clearing wage can cause
unemployment and still be sustainable if deviation from the norm is costlier, in terms of
reputation, than the monetary benet from adhering to it. The higher the proportion of
followers of the norm, the more sustainable it is - as it becomes more costly to deviate. Fol-
lowing this theoretical conclusion, the question that arose was whether or not employment
can be considered as a social norm. Supposing it can be, then it can be tested whether
unemployment hurts more if one's reference group has little of it - that is if the norm is
not followed.
Clark (2003) provides strong evidence supporting this hypothesis. He nds that un-
employment at regional, partner and household level positively, strongly aects well-being
when the respondent is unemployed, the eect being higher for men. Backing this hy-
pothesis one nds results from Russian data (Eggers et al, 2006) and from South Africa
(Powdthavee, 2006).
Stutzer and Lalive (2004) also test Akerlof's theory. They instrument for the unob-
served social norms by using a referendum on unemployment benets to extract the voting
patterns across localities in Switzerland, to proxy for social norms. To correct for the po-
5tential reversed causation (regional unemployment causes the norm) they use a stratied
approach, which is the variation in the proxy accounts for variation within regions. Their
results suggest that, indeed, in cantons voting to reduce benets (strong work ethic), the
unemployed were more likely to nd a job than in cantons voting for a rise in benets
(weaker work ethic). For those not having the same native language as the canton, the
eect was lower. These results emphasize the view that unemployment can be interpreted
as a social norm.
Given that unemployment reduces happiness, but that an increase in unemployment in
the reference group attenuates this negative impact, the question has been raised to know
whether the duration of unemployment is aected by the level of it in the individual's
reference group, broadly dened. This will be the main focus of this paper.
2.3 Unemployment Duration and Subjective Well-Being
To know how SWB is related to unemployment duration, many papers ask if duration
aects SWB; because it is relevant to know whether or not individuals adapt to unem-
ployment. Clark (2006) nds that there is no (or little) evidence of habituation. After the
initial drop in well-being when losing a job, individuals do not become happier with time
unless they change status.
There is however another channel through which well-being and duration might be
related. Looking for a job entails a costly eort, needing investment in readings ads,
writing applications, mobilizing one's network, etc. If the utility dierences between states
(employed and unemployed) is small, it might not be worth suering the search cost for
an outcome that is uncertain. This paper shows that in high unemployment regions, SWB
falls less when individuals lose their job. Hence, the incentive to return to work is reduced,
since the utility dierence is smaller. This might aect search behavior, and unemployment
duration might be longer, aecting in turn the behaviour of others in a self-reinforcing
fashion. This mechanism is very similar to the one described in Akerlof (1980). If the
norm is employment, and it is not much followed, there are less bad reputation eects
from not following it. It suggest that shocks matter because they aect the labor supply
behaviour. If this story holds, then there is a continuum of equilibria - as one's status
aects other's search behaviour. The present thesis attempts to nd whether or not the
job search behaviour (and unemployment duration) is aected by the social norm eect.
Future research should aim at modeling labor supply and job search including externalities
- to capture the eect mentioned above.
63 Data Description
The data set used in this paper is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The data is
collected on households and individuals aged 16 or older, once a year between the months
of September and May. It covers a representative sample of the British population during
16 years (1991-2006), providing information on almost 10.000 households over the period.
For waves 1 to 8 there are around 10.000 individual observations by year, whereas for
waves 9-16 there are on average 15.000 yearly individual observations4 . This means that
the panel is unbalanced: during the sixteen years of the survey, some households and indi-
vidual leave while others enter the sample.
We keep in the sample individuals aged between 21 and 65 years who are active in the
labour force - either working or actively looking for a job. Given that we keep only working
age population, the mean age in the sample changes to around 40 years old, as opposed to
45 for the whole survey. Table A.1 in the appendix provides a summary of statistics for
the variables in the survey.
The measure of well-being used is derived from the General Health Questionnaire
(GHQ). It has been designed by Goldberg (1972), and is widely used by psychiatrists
to assess a person's well-being. The 12 questions asked are provided in the appendix. As
presented by Argyle (1989, 2002) the GHQ is one of the most reliable indicators of psycho-
logical distress. I use an "inverted Caseness score"5. The distribution of this variable is
given in table A.2, in the appendix. It is observable that the distribution is highly skewed to
the top, with most of the respondents scoring 12, the highest possible grade. Only a quar-
ter (26 %) scores less than 10. Looking at the distribution of GHQ by employment status,
one can note the following two facts. First, the mean of GHQ is signicantly lower for un-
employed persons, if one compares them to the employed or self-employed population (9,1
for the unemployed vs. 10,4 for the employed and 10,1 for the whole population sample.).
Second, the distribution of GHQ has a larger variance in the unemployed group, where
26% of the respondents declare a low well-being (dened as a score inferior to 8), against
13% and 12% for the employed and self-employed. These distributional characteristics are
clearly presented in Table 1 and Figure 1, below.
4In 1999, 1500 households were added from both Scotland and Wales. In 2001, another 2000
households were added from Northern Ireland. More information can be found on the BHPS at
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps
5There are 12 questions, and the score ranges from 0 to 12. Individuals start with a score of 12, and
for each question in which they are fairly or highly stressed, they lose a point. Psychiatrists use the GHQ
































































































































































































































































84 Determinants of Subjective Well-Being
Subjective well-being is obviously not only related to employment status. A multivariate
approach is necessary. Income, health, age, education, and civic status are all likely to
directly aect an individual's well-being. As the GHQ caseness score is an ordinal measure
(it is not a continuous variable), a linear probability model is not the best tool to estimate
its determinants 6. An ordered probit regression is used to complement the results of the
OLS regression, and the results from both methods will be discussed below. The results on
the main determinants of SWB are in regression table 2, which shows the ordered probit
estimation. Table A.3 in the appendix shows the results from the OLS regressions. Three
specications are presented for both cases, in which the explained variable is subjective
well-being.
The three OLS equations estimated are shown below. Si stands for labor market status;
Yi for income; Educi for educational achievement, the reference category being no diploma.
Healthi stands for the health status, the reference being excellent health. The reference
dummy for civic status is never married and Xi stands for the control of all previous
variables.




Witj = 0 + 1Sit + 2Xit + 3Y earj + 4Regionk + i (3)
In the rst specication, labor market status is the only regressor, for which the refer-
ence category is "Employed". The coecients indicate that the self-employed are slightly
but signicantly happier than the employed, when other life variables are not controlled
for. The unemployed are the least happy. In the OLS regression, they have around 1:2
points less of well-being than the employed. The coecients of the ordered probit indi-
cate that Unemployed are 40% less likely to have a score of 12 than the employed, when
controlling for other factors. In the second specication controls are added for the list of
individual characteristics mentioned above. In the third specication, children dummies,
year and region xed eects are included. The results in all three specications are in line
with those found in Clark (2003) using the rst seven waves of the BHPS.
6because the distribution of the disturbance term is not normal anymore - standard errors and t-stats
are thus invalid. An ordered probit increases the t and provides reliable z-stats, instead of the t-stats.
9104.1 Labor Market Status, Age, Income, Civic Status, Education and
Health
In all specications, the coecient for males is positive and signicant (0.5 points higher
than females). This indicates that men self-report higher levels of well-being than women.
This is also visible in the raw mean, where men are 0.5 points happier than women. The
eect of age is U-shaped, conrming the results found in the literature 7, bottoming in the
late thirties.
Consistent with most of the literature ndings, the eect of marriage is slightly pos-
itive, while being separated, divorced or widowed is on average associated with a lower
well-being. This should not be seen as a causal eect, as it could also be possible that
being inherently happy favors one's marriage prospects. To isolate the causal eect of
marriage or divorce we need to look at transitions between civic states.8 This is done in
Clark and Lucas (2006). Using the GSOEP, they nd that marriage increases happiness
but that a habituation eect exists. The prospect of marriage (cohabitation) raises well-
being 3 years before marriage, but this increase in happiness does not last longer than 3
years after the marriage date9. The channels through which marriage causes the rise in
well-being are explained in Argyle (2002). An intimate relationship enhances self-esteem
and it can attenuate stress from other life activities like one's job.
The eect of income on SWB is particularly interesting. As found in Easterlin (1974,
2001), income is a poor estimator of happiness. The results found in the literature suggest
that relative income matters more than income itself, and income growth is important but
not its level (above a certain threshold). These results highlight the role of comparisons,
to others and to oneself in the past. The coecients we nd are negative and insignicant,
conrming this story. However, when one goes from specication 2 to specication 3, the
coecient remains negative and becomes slightly signicant. This suggests that a higher
income might be associated with other variables that we are not controlling for (such as
hours of work) that are negatively correlated with SWB. In the appendix a specication
controlling for relative income is presented. Being in the top quarter of the wage distri-
bution has no signicant impact on well being. The eect of education is also interesting.
The higher the achievement the lower the SWB. The current explanation is that a higher
diploma leads also to higher income expectation, which reduces satisfaction for a given
level of income. (see Argyle, 2002, and Frey and Stutzer, 2001, on expectations).
7See Clark and Oswald(1994), Blanch
ower and Oswald (2007), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Winkelmann
and Winkelmann (1998)
8Which gender benets more from marriage has been subject to intense debate. Bernard (1972) proposed
that men benet much more from marriage than women. Glenn (1975) shows the opposite. More recent
ndings using subjective well-being data conrm Bernard (Fowers, 2004), while others show that marriage
increases happiness equally between genders.
9Stutzer and Frey (2006), using the same data, nd exactly the same results
11Table 3, above, reports the results for the eect of labor market transitions on SWB. We
observe that upon losing their job, those who were employed report on average a drop of
1,08 in their SWB, and 0,91 if they were self-employed. This is a signicant fall, given how
the distribution is skewed to the right. The transitions from unemployment to employment
or self-employment are associated with large increases in well-being (correspondingly 1,41
and 1,20 points). People do feel better when they nd a job.
There is however an asymmetry in this process. On average, individuals report a larger
gain in well-being when returning to work than the loss they report when losing it. This
asymmetry is an interesting behavioral fact also found in Clark (2003). No references
have been found in the literature pointing towards this asymmetry. 10 In the appendix,
we provide the same transitional matrix decomposed by gender. The pattern by gender
is the same, but males report higher drops and peaks than females. Transitions from
unemployment to employment provide males with a 1.6 jump in SWB, compared to a 1.15
for females. When they lose their job, males report a drop of 1.15 points compared to a
10Possible explanations could be that upon nding a job people are overcondent, so they report a high
jump in well-being. It could also be that when losing a job, people are condent they will nd another one
quickly, so they don't worry too much. In any case, the asymmetry means that jobs are less valued when
they are lost than when they are lled. In job search theory, the present value of unemployment or of a
position is independent of whether the position is lled. Perhaps jobs created are more valuable than jobs
destroyed - hinting at the possibility of a Schumpeterian creative destruction process.
121 point drop for females. The transition from self-employment to employment gives much
greater rewards to females (0.4 points more) than to males (0.1), which could be interpreted
as a more risk-loving behavior of men.
4.2 The Social Norm Eect of Unemployment
The literature on happiness highlights the important role of comparisons in individuals'
well-being. It is income relative to others that matters or to oneself in the past. A slightly
dierent comparison mechanism is at play when it comes to labor market status, but com-
parisons are still present. The previous section shows that the transition from employment
to unemployment is causing a drop in SWB. Furthermore, there is no habituation eect :
the unemployed feel on average signicantly worse than those in employment, even after
controlling for other factors11. Aware of this pattern, a relevant question arises. How does
other's employment aects one's well-being ? Are those losing a job also comparing them-
selves to others in unemployment? If yes, in what ways ? Finally, do these comparisons
aect their job search behavior ?
4.2.1 Theory : a binary choice model with externalities
As in Akerlof's (1980) social norm model, we can add others' behavior and beliefs in the
utility function. Whereas previous well-being estimations were only accounting for per-
sonal unemployment (Ue) and were of the form Wi = W(Ue;X), we are now interested in
a utility function including a norm, beliefs and reputation eects, such that
Wi = W(G;R;A;dc;)
Agent's utility Wi is dependent on their private consumption G, their reputation R,
their belief in the norm dc, obedience to the norm A(1,0), and personal tastes . Let
us suppose that reputation depends itself on the proportion of believers  and one's own
actions A, such that R = R(;A). If everyone believes in the norm ( = 1) and agent
i does not follow it (A=0), he suers from reputation eects. As less people believe in
the norm, the reputation eect from not following it is reduced and this in turn pushes
more people not to obede. As Akerlof explains, if there are no reputation eects, the
only possible equilibria are derived from the traditional utility function with tastes  and
consumption G. However, if deviation from the norm is costly in terms of reputation, we
may have a stable equilibrium in which the norm is self-sustained and agents follow it. It
is a simple example of a binary choice model with externalities, in which two equilibria are
sustainable.
11Clark (2006) nds that unhappiness does not decrease with unemployment length using the GSOEP
and the ECHP, but has mixed results using the BHPS




















































































































































































































































































































































































In this case the norm is employment. The adherence to the norm,  is the employment
rate. This follows Akerlof's model in the sense that if all other adhere to the norm, there
is a bad reputation eect from not following it. As the number of unemployed rises, the
stigma from being unemployed falls. Clark (2003) considers a linear form for reputation :
R = ( Uei(1   Ue
i). We follow his steps here, and the main equation is :
Wi = Wi[ Uei(1   Ue);1   Ue;X]
This allows for the following eects. Being unemployed hurts (through the rst term), a
rise in the unemployment rate hurts (through the second term), but it improves well-being
if one is unemployed (again rst term).
4.2.2 Empirical evidence : pooled data regressions
Figures 2 shows a simple plot of regional/yearly unemployment rates and the average well-
being dierence between employed and unemployed. The correlation is quite visible at
eye-level. In regions/years where unemployment is high, people report being less hurt when
they lose a job. Appendix A shows the regression results : a 1% increase in unemployment
corresponds to a 0.08 points drop in the loss of happiness. A rst empirical glimpse of this
relationship was found in Clark and Oswald (1994), though they used only the rst wave
14of the BHPS. They were unable to reject the shift-share hypothesis12. Clark (2003) uses
the rst seven waves of the BHPS to conrm this early prediction. He nds that in regions
with high unemployment, SWB falls less when losing a job. The same result is found in
this paper, extending the sample to 16 waves of the BHPS.
This nding suggests that unemployment hurts - but it hurts less the more there is
of it around. It suggest that labor market status is one important comparison aecting
well-being. The question often posed is who do people compare to ? Who are the relevant
others ? Is it the whole population or the people on the neighborhood? Is those of same
sex, age, income and educational achievement? Data on relevant others from the survey
can be used to test if employment in the reference group is also aecting well-being when
losing a job. The OLS estimations to test the hypothesis are the following.
Wit = 0 + 1Uit + 2Xit + 3RkU + 4(Uit  RkU) + i (4)
Wit = 0 + 1Uit + 5Xit + 6U + 7(Uit  U) + i (5)
Wit = 0 + 1Uit + 8Xit + 9U + 10(Uit  U) + i (6)
Where Wit stands for well-being of individual i at period t. Xi stands here for all other
determinants, year, region and children xed xed eects. Uit = 1 when the respondent
is unemployed. RkU stands for the regional unemployment rate; and U = 1 when the
relevant other is unemployed. The interaction terms are expected to be positive.
Following Moulton (1980) the estimation uses clustered standard errors for the regional
unemployment rates. This is because the regional unemployment rate is the same for all
individuals within the region. If the clustering is ignored, the repetition of the same value
in one variable is biasing downwards the standard errors.
The results of the regressions on pooled data are very straightforward. Table 4, below,
shows the ordered probit results. Table A.5, in the appendix shows the OLS results. In
the simple specication, one can see that the regional unemployment rate has no eect on
well-being. However, when one adds an interaction term between own unemployment and
regional unemployment rate, the coecient is positive and signicant. This re
ects the
nding of the previous graph: unemployment hurts, but it hurts less the more there is of
it around at the regional level.
The eect of spouse unemployment is also straightforward. Having an unemployed
spouse signicantly lowers one's well-being. The eect is 35 times higher than the regional
unemployment interaction. But the interaction term between own unemployment and the
12The shift-share hypothesis would hold if a rise in unemployment pushes the happier of the working
force into unemployment.
15Table 4 : Ordered Probit with Pooled Data
spouse's unemployment is positive and signicant : if one loses its job, having an unem-
ployed spouse is better than an employed one. The magnitude of the eect is also very
high (above a quarter point). It tells us that individuals are hurt when losing their job, but
they are hurt less if the reference group (here the spouse) is also unemployed. They also
tell us that the spouse is a much closer reference group than the regional unemployment
rate. The results of the broad specication show no dierence in the coecients, suggesting
little multicollinearity between the two interaction terms.
4.2.3 Empirical evidence : results with panel data specication
The results of the regressions using individual xed eects are somehow less forward.
Controlling for each individual's unobserved heterogeneity leads to losing as many degrees
of freedom as individuals. As a result, the signicance of some coecients is lost. The
regression table 5, below, (and tables A.6 and A.7 in the appendix) present the results on
the regressions controlling for individual xed eects. The results from the specications
13 to 15 show that unemployment hurts men twice as more than women. The interaction
term between own and regional unemployment is signicant only for men, suggesting that
women do not suer from regional comparisons. The magnitude of the eect for men (0.04)
is the same as in the previous specication using pooled data (Table A.5). Specications
16 to 18 show that women suer six times more than men from having an unemployed
partner, both eects being signicant, and quite high for women. The interaction term
16Table 5 : OLS Regression with Individual Fixed Eects
between spouse and own unemployment is positive and very strong for men, but small and
insignicant for women. In other words, spouse's unemployment hurts more women than
men, but men compare more to their spouses.
4.3 A note on the use of Pooled data vs Fixed Eect
4.3.1 Pooled Data
The standard specication for an OLS estimation of well-being using panel data is the
following :







pZpi + t + it
Where Yit is the dependent variable (here the GHQ-12) for individual i in time t. Xj are
the observed explanatory variables (employment, age, gender, civic status, etc.). Zpi are
the unobserved variables aecting subjective well-being, and they are the ones responsible
for the unobserved heterogeneity and for creating the noise. it is the disturbance term
and t is added to control for a change in the intercept over time.
Assuming that Zpi, the unobserved explanatory variables, do not change over time, the
equation above can be rewritten as :
Yit = 1 +
k X
j=2




pZpi ; and i stands for the unobserved eect of all Z on Yi. It
measures the individuals' specic unobserved xed eect.
This unobserved, individual-specic xed eect can be dropped if it is not signicant.
This could be done if all relevant characteristics aecting GHQ are captured by the controls
X. If this is the case, then the ij term can be dropped and the data set can be used
as a pooled data set, in which all observations from the dierent years are used in the
same sample. The present paper presents the pooled data results before presenting the
next step, the panel data results.
4.3.2 Fixed Eects Regressions : individual xed-eects
Well-being levels reported by one person can be thought of being subjectively dierent that
those reported by another person. If one cannot compare a well-being of 10 between two
individuals, then we might want to control for individual xed eects, as we are interested
in understanding how changes in explanatory variables relate to changes in well-being. To
do so, we must subtract the mean values of all variables (of individual i) to each observation.
The mean variables are found by the equation below :
 Yi = 1 +
k X
j=2
j  Xji + i +  t +  i
Where  Yi accounts for the mean happiness of individual i during the years surveyed. When
subtracting the individual's mean observation to their yearly observation, we obtain an
equation in which the unobserved individual xed eect i disappears, as also does the
intercept 1. The regression controlling for individual xed eects is shown below :
Yit    Yi =
k X
j=2
j(Xjit    Xji) + (t    t) + it    i
This within-group regression measures how the variation in observable explanatory
variables aects the variation in happiness.
Three main problems arise when using individual xed eects. First, the intercept and
any explanatory variable reporting no change during the time of the survey is dropped.
Since we are measuring how change in variables explain change in happiness, then gender,
educational achievement and civic status will not be taken into account unless they change
: their value will be zero. Second, the variation of explanatory variables within-individuals
is much smaller than the variation across them. The model will have large disturbance
terms and low precision in the estimates. Third, and most important, using individual
xed eect means we are controlling for every single individual. This leads to the loss of
18many degrees of freedom (as many as individuals). It signicantly reduces the precision of
the coecients.
195 Unemployment Duration
The BHPS contains a detailed module on each employment/unemployment episode from
every individual in the sample. Merging this data with the previous yearly household sur-
vey makes it possible to run a duration model of unemployment spells in order to nd the
main determinants of its duration. The sample is right-censored: information is not avail-
able on spells nishing after wave 16. Some random censoring also occurs as individuals
are randomly lost during the 16 waves.
Over the 16 years of the sample, we have data on 5700 unemployment spells13. The
average duration of a spell is 23 months, but there is a great heterogeneity as half of the
spells end before the 12th month and 70% of them before the 24th month. The distribution
is distinctly skewed to the right, articially pushing the mean to 23 months. Table 5.1
summarizes some descriptive statistics on the spells. Figure 5.2 shows the survival function
of spells, decomposed by gender.
5.1 Determinants of duration
The dierences between genders is very clear: women spend on average less time in unem-
ployment. Selection issues are very likely to be the cause of this dierence. Participation
rates are higher for men than for women14, so it is possible that working women dier
signicantly from their non-working peers, whereas this is less the case for men. Dier-
ences across regions are also evident. Unemployment duration is much higher in Scotland,
Northern Ireland and Wales than in London and in the South. Age is a major determinant
as younger individuals have shorter spells than older ones, in both genders. Finally, indi-
viduals with a higher educational achievement have on average shorter spells (15.4 months)
than the low achievers (32.1 months).
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide visual evidence of two clear discontinuities in the rate of
return to work. The rst discontinuity is found in the months 10 and 11, in which the
rate of return to work is signicantly higher than in the immediate preceding or following
months. The main suspect for causing this discontinuity is the reduction in benets occur-
ring on the 12th month. The same story applies for months 22 and 23, as the benets are
also reduced on the 24th month. For some individuals, monetary incentives seem to play
a signicant role in the rate of return to work, as the anticipation of a drop in benets
pushed them to return to a paid job. These results are in line with the literature on job
search behavior. The theoretical model of Mortensen (1977) predicts a rise in the hazard
13Spells longer than 12 years are (arbitrarily) taken out of the sample. They are outliers irrelevant to the
present analysis and bias the results
14Women's participation rates have increased from 70% to almost 75% between 1991 and 2006 (the years
covered in this survey). Men participation rates are above 85%
20ratio as one gets closer to the benets exhaustion time. Meyer (1990) nds evidence of
large spikes in the hazard in the prior weeks before exhaustion, a result that is also shared
by a large amount of literature 15.
To summarize: age, gender, region and educational achievement all seem to be corre-
lated with unemployment duration; while monetary incentives also play a signicant role as
the deadline of benet exhaustion approaches. In the next subsection it will be asked how
unemployment duration and well-being are related. As duration spent in unemployment
and well-being can in
uence each-other, it is dicult to isolate the impact of one on the
other. Individuals might suer when they lose their job, but perhaps they also get used to
be unemployed. Hence, we could observe that time spent on unemployment has a positive
eect on well-being. A reverse mechanism could also exist. The well-being dierence be-
tween the two states can play as an incentive to return to work. As the gap of well-being
increases between being jobless and employed, the incentive to nd a job increases, thus
reducing duration. Understanding which of these stories is true (both can be) is important
for both policy and research reasons, as it will be explained below.
5.1.1 Unemployment duration and well-being: how to nd the causality di-
rection ?
Unemployment duration might aect well-being through a habituation eect. In their re-
view of unemployment-related psychology ndings, Darity and Goldsmith(1996) describe
three phases of emotional response after a job loss. A rst shock phase where optimism
still predominates, followed by a phase of pessimism and helplessness, and nally a phase
of fatalism feelings with habituation.
If individuals adapt to being jobless, we should observe a higher well-being in long-term
unemployed than in those who recently lost their job. Controlling for individual eects we
should observe, among the unemployed, a rise in well-being with time spent in unemploy-
ment. However, upon comparing well-being across dierent categories of unemployed one
cannot rule out a sample selection issue - arising in pooled regressions.16 That is why
pooled regressions yield dierent estimates than panel data regressions. Using panel data
(individual xed eects) is the proper way to estimate the impact of duration on well-being.
Clark (2006) does this exercise using three European panel data sets. For the pooled data,
he uses an interaction term between duration and unemployment. He nds that panel data
15Mot (1985), Meyer (1990), Vodopivec (1995), Dormont et al (2001) all nd, using data from dierent
countries, that the exit rate from unemployment to employment rises sharply as the end of the entitlement
period approaches. See Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) for a review of ndings.
16Through a shift-share mechanism. Those who stay unemployed longer are dierent : those suering the
most might have left to inactivity or back to work. Those suering less from unemployment stay jobless.
A selection bias arises in cross-section
21Table 5.1
Table 1: Unemployment Spells - Descriptive Statistics by Demographics
Variable Men (Std.Dev) Women (Std.Dev) All(Std.Dev)
Average 26.9 - (31.9) 18.0 - (23.7) 23.7- (29.6)
6 months or less % 29.2 35.0 31.2
12 months or less % 46.3 61.5 51.7
24 months or less % 65.4 79.6 70.4
Region
Inner London 28.3 - (26.1) 18.0 - (21.8) 24.3 - (25)
Rest SE 21.9 - (27.6) 13.2 - (15.7) 18.2- (23.7)
South West 21.0 - (27.7) 12.1 - (12.8) 17.9- (24.0)
Scotland 30.9 - (37.6) 20.6 - (26.7) 27.0- (34.3)
Wales 27.6 - (32.5) 24.0 - (32.7) 26.3 - (32.6)
N.Ireland 27.2 - (33.6) 25.6 - (32.6) 26.6 - (33.2)
Age
Age  50 34.9 - (37.1) 22.3- (25.8) 30.6 - (34.2)
Age  35 22.1 -(27.3) 15.9 -(22.3) 19.9-(25.8)
Educational Achievement
Low 36.2 - (36.6) 23.7- (28.3) 32.1 - (34.6)
Medium 20.7 -(24.7) 17.5 -(22.5) 19.5-(23.9)
High 18.1 -(24.6) 10.5 -(13.7) 15.4-(21.7)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































does not support the hypothesis of habituation, when using the GSOEP and the ECHP17,
but the results are not signicant using the BHPS. The same exercise is executed here.
Using pooled data, the interaction term between unemployment and its duration, it
is found that unemployment duration has a positive and signicant eect on well-being,
when one does not control for the other life variables. However, if one controls for life
variables, then duration has no eect on well-being. This hints that duration is associated
with the life variables mentioned above, but not directly with well-being. The transition
matrix shown before provides evidence that staying in unemployment has no dierent eect
on well-being than staying in employment. As pooled data is not rigourous, panel data
specications are used. Introducing individual xed eects makes it possible to regress the
change in well-being to the change in duration. A xed eect logit is used to estimate this
eect of duration on well-being, for the unemployed. The results show that the coecient
of duration is not signicant. Hence, it can be said that the eect of unemployment on
well-being is independent from its duration. These results are shown in the appendix.
Table A.8 shows the pooled results, and Table A.9 the xed eects results.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 The role of social norms in duration
This section tests whether the length of the unemployment spell is aected by the change
in well-being reported when losing one's job. A variable is created that calculates the re-
ported change in happiness when the individual is made redundant. This variable is named
"Dierence in happiness". It stands for Ve   Vu, which in the job search theory literature
is the utility dierence between being employed (Ve), and unemployed, (Vu). Even though
information on 5700 unemployment spells are available, there are only 1400 observations
for the reported changes in well-being. This is due to the fact that data for SWB is yearly,
whereas the unemployment spells are coded monthly. The distribution of this variable is
presented in gure 5.4.
The gure 5.4 has to be read as follows : 10% of the individuals report a drop of -1 in
well-being, when losing their job. 31% report feeling no change in their well-being. As it
is observable, a signicant proportion of the individuals record feeling happier when losing
a job (almost 18%). The majority, however, reports feeling worse o (42%). The average
change in well-being is equal to  1, on a scale going from  12 to 12. This is a considerable
drop, given that SWB is highly skewed to the top. .
To estimate the determinants of duration, two regression model are performed. The
rst is a standard OLS regression, and the second a proportional hazard model. The results
from these models are shown in table 5.2. As shown before, there are large dierences in
duration, by gender, age, regions and educational achievement; so these are used as con-
trols. The regional jobless rate is also likely to aect time spent looking for work: if more
people compete to get jobs, average search duration should increase. As shown in the em-
24pirical literature, unemployment benets should also increase duration, because they have
an eect on the reservation wage. We also add a dummy for unemployed spouse. Finally,
we test two dierent measures of well-being. First, we add the coecient "dierence in
happiness". Second, we create a dummy when the initial drop in well-being is larger than
1, and we call it bigloss. The results are presented in table 5.2, and all the details about the
modeling of duration and the signicance of the coecients are explained on the section
8.2 of the appendix.
The results from the OLS regression (columns 1 to 4) are in line with those from the du-
ration model (columns 5 to 5). Women, the young and the highly educated spend less time
in unemployment. When more people are jobless in one's region, duration increases. Ben-
ets also push individuals to keep looking for a job longer (their reservation wage is higher).
Column 4 shows that the coecient dierence in happiness is positive and signicant
at the 1% level. Since the change in well-being is negative, it suggests that the more an
individual says it suers from losing a job, the quicker he returns to work. Column 3
conrms this intuition: those who suered a big loss in well-being when losing their job
are spending less time in unemployment. The results suggest that a one point increase in
happiness (when losing a job) is associated with a 0.3 months increase in unemployment
duration, even after controlling for other factors.
Finally, having an unemployed spouse increases one's unemployment duration, possibly
due to the comparison eect presented earlier. The proportional hazard model conrms
the OLS results. Those who suered a big loss have a higher hazard rate, while the di-hap
coecient is negative : the less one is hurt by unemployment, the lower the hazard rate
out of unemployment.
25Table 5.2



















































































































































































































































































































































5.2.1 Social norms and duration : empirical evidence from the duration model
Another piece of evidence suggesting that those who suer more from the job loss return to
work quicker is provided in the Figure 5.5, below, where a Kaplan-Meier survival function
is estimated. The sample of unemployment spells is split in 2 dierent sub-samples. Those
for whom the loss is high (drop of 2 or more in well-being) are grouped together in the
high-loss sample. Those for whom the loss is low (no change or increase in well-being) are
grouped in the low-loss group. Then, a Kaplan-Meier survival function is estimated for
each sub-sample. The results are shown in the graph 5.5 below. The graph shows 2 lines.
The blue line (above) estimates the rate of return to work for those who suered less from
the job loss. The red line (below) estimates the rate for those for suered more. For the
least happy, the rate of return to work is higher (red line) than for those who suer less
(blue line).
The dierence in both survival functions is signicant at the 80% level from the 5th
month onwards. Hence, this gure provides some visual evidence that the rate of return to
work is lower for individuals who report being less hurt from unemployment18. In the next
18This result also conrms the prediction of Clark (2006) that sample selection bias arises if one uses
pooled data OLS regressions to estimate the impact of unemployment duration on well-being. It seems
that those feeling worse leave unemployment sooner than the others
27subsection, it is shown that the channel through which their return rate is lower could be
their search eort.
5.3 Is search intensity related to change in GHQ ?
The BHPS has a section designed in a similar way to the LFS (Labor Force Survey),
intended to measure unemployment by the ILO standards. In this section, unemployed
persons are being asked if they have been searching for a job in the last week, and/or in
the last month, their response being limited to Yes/No. Their answer can provide some
information on the search intensity of the group as a whole. Using the previous sample
of GHQ dierences, two groups are created. The rst group consists of those who report
a large utility loss (higher than 1 point of SWB) when they lose their job. The second
group consists of those who report either no utility change or are happier being unemployed.
Search intensity varies slightly between the two groups. It is observed that 62% of the
group suering from being unemployed searched for work last week, whereas this drops to
55% for the other group. These results suggest that the unemployed modify their search
behavior according to how much they report being hurt by the job loss 19. A means test
conrms that the two means are dierent, at the 95% condence level, the results of the
test are in table A.11 of the appendix.
We provide in the appendix a probit of "search last week", in which we use the same
controls as for duration. Unfortunately, our variables of SWB do not seem to be signicant,
exept for bigloss, whose eect is positive and signicant, but only at the 10% level. Fur-
ther data could conrm our prediction, and show that those suering a bigloss are indeed
searching more frequently. Table A.10 presents the results of the search probit.
Table 2: Search intensity : "Have you looked for any kind of paid job in the last week?" -
population mean by groups
Variable Mean Std. Err. N.Obs
High GHQ drop 0.625 .021 554
No GHQ drop 0.55 .028 324
19An reverse causality issue can arise : maybe search is causing unhappiness. As soon as search stops,
happiness increases (true when they nd a job or when they search less). If this holds, then all the
results/conclusions in the present thesis are wrong. The reason why this does not hold is because we are
using the initial drop in happiness.
285.4 Conclusion on unemployment duration
The length of time an individual spends being unemployed depends on numerous factors
and aects an equally large number of outcomes. Gender and age can be thought of ex-
ogenous but one cannot distinguish between supply or demand factors through which they
aect the rate of return to work. Is it that the women and the young are better at looking
for jobs, more motivated (supply side), or is it that demand for them is higher ?
The interrelation between SWB and search intensity provides -at last - a pure labor
supply story. Upon losing their job, people self-report a drop in their subjective well-being.
This drop depends on how many other around are unemployed, and it also aects their
search behaviour. When those around are jobless, being unemployed hurts less and job
search eort is less intensive. Hence, the rate of return to work is also lower. These results
suggest that the job search intensity and the rate of return to work are both dependent on
the dierence of well being between being employed and unemployed. In standard models
of job search, the intensity of search is also derived from the utility dierences from the two
states. However, in those models, utility is only determined by the dierences in the 
ow
of income. The results presented here suggest that comparison eects play a signicant
role in the rate of return to work.
296 Conclusion
Previous literature (Clark, 2003) found that the higher the unemployment rate among an
individuals' reference group, the less that individual reported being hurt by unemployment,
which was called the "social norm eect". In this paper, we provide more evidence of the
"social norm eect". We show that albeit the comparison eect is strong, it diers by
gender. Women suer more than men when their spouse is made redundant. But men
compare more, both to their spouses and to their regional peers. When men they lose their
job, they suer, but they suer less if their spouse is also unemployed.
This paper goes one step further. It provides evidence that the duration of unemploy-
ment is aected by this "social norm". It is suggested here that job search behaviour is also
dependent on the social norm, on the individual's perception of how socially stigmatising
is unemployment.
The lesson to be drawn by these ndings is that one's employment decisions have a
strong externality on other's labor supply and job search eort, through comparison eects.
Upon losing a job, if a relevant other is also jobless then both individuals search with less
intensity. In the opposite scenario, if all relevant others are employed, search intensity
increases for the unemployed. It suggest that participation to the labor market should be
seen as a binary model with externalities. One's decision aects the others. As in Neumark
and Postlewaite (1998) this mechanism helps in explaining the rise in women's participa-
tion rates in the 20th century, and complements the standard model of labor supply. It
also explains why in high unemployment regions the jobless rate might remain higher than
in low regions, or why it may take longer to fall.
Explanations of unemployment hysteresis have been so far centred around labor de-
mand. The present ndings suggest unemployment hysteresis might also come from the
labor supply behaviour. If others are unemployed, I will search less and extend my un-
employment duration, in turn aecting other's return to work. Many policy implications
arise. One concerns the responses to exogenous macroeconomic shocks. Following a la-
bor demand shock, as unemployment rises, the labor supply might also fall (shift to the
left) through a comparison eect. It suggest that a policy response should correct for this
externality in times of high unemployment. Future empirical research should examine in
more detail the link between search intensity and the social norm eect. Future theoretical
research should asses what policy responses arise now that we know how one's participation
aects the others.
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338 Appendix
8.1 Is the GHQ-12 a good measure of Well-Being?
As presented by Argyle, the 12-item version of the GHQ is a good test for the following
reasons. First, it has internal coherence. The 12 item correlate with each other : the
Cronbach alpha is high. Second, the scores are stable over time but sensible to changes
when the individual reports going through current hassles. Third, the score is correlated
to reports by others who know the subject, and also to daily reports of moods, to cognitive
measures and to reports from qualitative interviews. Fourth, the "immediate mood bias"
is not likely to aect GHQ because the questionnaire asks questions related to the past
weeks. Positivity bias is present in all types of surveys. Everyone is overcondent - except
chronic depressives. Fifth, scales are comparable across individuals. The 12 questions used
to build the GHQ-12 are as follow :
1. Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?
2. Have you recently lost much sleep over worry?
3. Have you recently felt constantly under strain ?
4. Have you recently felt you could not overcome your diculties ?
5. Have you recently been feeling unhappy or depressed?
6. Have you recently been losing condence in yourself ?
7. Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?
8. Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities ?
9. Have you recently been able to face up to problems?
10. Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered ?
11. Have you recently felt capable of making decisions about things?
12. Have you recently felt that you were playing a useful part in things ?
For question 1, the responses are :
Better than usual (1) ; Same as usual (2) ; Less than usual (3) ; Much less than
usual (4)
For questions, 2 to 7, the responses are :
Not at all (1) No more than usual (2) ; Rather more than usual (3) ; Much more
than usual (4).
For questions 8 to 12, the responses are : More so than usual (1) About same as usual
(2) Less so than usual (3) Much less than usual (4)
348.2 Duration model
This appendix provides some explanations for the duration model of unemployment. Each
unemployment spell T is calculated in months. In terms of duration modeling, the length
of each episode is the survival time in unemployment. We call the time of transition out
of unemployment t, that is the failure time (it is the moment at which the event fails).
The cumulative distribution of T is F(t), and the density function is the derivative of the
cumulative function with respect to time : f(t) =
dF(t)
dt .
The distribution of this variable T is given in the table 10.xx . For simplicity reasons, I
truncate the distribution at T = 100, as we are not interested in outliers. The distribution
of this variable T is given by the equation :
F(t) = P(T  t)
This distribution F(t) measures the probability of survival up to the time t. T should
be seen as a continuous variable. As such, it is the rst derivative of the distribution
function.
The survival function S(t) denotes the probability that the spell T continues after t
or longer. For example, taking the whole sample of spells, the probability of surviving 13
months in the unemployment state is of :5 or 50%.
S(t) = P(T > t) = 1   F(t)
Another example for the survival function : the probability of surviving 5 months in
unemployment is 75% It is equal to the spells that are left, or to 1 minus proportion of
spells that ended before time t.
Duration models are not always needed. We can always regress duration on other
control variables, or estimate the conditional probability of an event with a binomial re-
gression. Duration modeling is needed when we need to go beyond. If we are interested
in knowing the probability of being unemployed for another month given that we were
unemployed 10 months, then we need survival analysis, as this information does not come
in a plain regression. Also, if we need to know the conditional probability that an ongoing
spell will end, controlling for other variables, then we need survival analysis.
The Hazard function or the failure rate (t) measures the death rate given survival
until time t. Example : the failure rate between the months 12 and 23 is 50%. It means :
conditional on making it to the 12th month, there is a 50% chance that the spell will end
before the 24th month. It is measured as follows:
(t) = lim
!0
P(t  T  t + jT  t)

The cumulative hazard function is something very similar. It measures the probability
of surviving over a time span [t, t+d] and it is found by integrating the hazard function





When integrating the cumulative hazard at a given point, we obtain the survival func-
tion: S(t) = e 
R t
0 (x)d(x)
8.2.1 Cox Proportional Hazard
Above we explain the basics of duration models, but we are now interested in understand-
ing the duration conditional on other variables. The Cox proportional hazard allows to
condition duration. Stata provides a command (stcox) to run a cox proportional hazard.
It estimates following proportional hazard :
i(t) = exi:0(t)
Where xi stands for the value of variables aecting duration, and  is their coecient.
i(t) is the hazard rate of individual i, and 0 stands for the baseline hazard.
In the regression result from section 6, the proportional hazard ratio  associated with
the happiness dierence is equal to 0;97. It means that the eect of a one point increase
in happiness when losing a job is associated with a 2.3 months increase in unemployment
duration.
368.3 Regression Results and tables
Table 3: Table A.1 : Summary statistics of the survey
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Waves 1 to 16
Number of Households
In the whole survey . 9897
In restricted sample . 7562
Number of Observations - individuals per years
In the whole survey 199,322 .
In restricted sample 151,567 .
male 0.462 0.499 151567
age 40.926 12.586 151567
Married 0.594 0.491 151376
Separated 0.025 0.157 151376
Divorced 0.093 0.29 151376
Widowed 0.022 0.148 151376
Never Married 0.264 0.441 151376
Health Excellent 0.251 0.433 151505
Health Good 0.48 0.5 151505
Health Poor 0.27 0.444 151505
Educational Achievement : Other 0.279 0.449 149779
Educational Achievement : High 0.391 0.488 149779
Educational Achievement : Medium 0.33 0.47 149779
Employment Status, in % of the sample
self employed 8.56 . 12968
in paid employ 62.50 . 94700
unemployed 4.41 . 6688
retired 6.52 . 9881
family care 1.07 . 1617
ft student 8.60 . 13033
long term sick/disabled 2.75 . 4164
on maternity leave 5.04 . 7641
govt trng scheme 0.13 . 200
something else 0.42 . 635
As explained in section section 3 (Data Description), I provide here some basic statistics of
the survey, in table A.1. It can be seen that there are almost 10.000 households in the 16
waves, but the restriction of the sample to the working age population reduces it to 7562.
Married, Separated, Widowed, Divorced and Never Married are dummies. An individual
37has to be one (and only one) of these categories. Health is also a dummy, as Educational
achievement. It can be seen, on the employment status table, the number of self-employed,
employed and unemployed individuals.
Table 4: Table A.2 : Distribution of GHQ-12
Variable Frequency Pct Cumulative Pct.
GHQ12
0 2,594 1.76 1.76
1 2,093 1.42 3.17
2 2,199 1.49 4.66
3 2,426 1.64 6.30
4 2,779 1.88 8.18
5 3,357 2.27 10.45
6 3,956 2.68 13.13
7 4,992 3.38 16.51
8 6,160 4.17 20.68
9 8,264 5.59 26.27
10 11,843 8.01 34.28
11 20,026 13.55 47.83
12 77,097 52.17 100.00
Table A.2 : OLS regression GHQ-12 on its primary determinants.
Table A.2 provides the distribution of the GHQ-12 variable that measures well-being.
38Table A.3: OLS regression of the determinants of GHQ-12
39Table A.4 : OLS regression, eect of the regional unemployment rate on the GHQ
dierence between employed and unemployed.
Table 5: Table A.4 : Regression of Regional unemployment rate on Dierence in GHQ in
region






40The transition matrix above shows how subjevtive well-being changes after a transition
between labor states; for both men and women.
41Table A.5 : OLS regression, GHQ-12 on determinants
42Table A.6 : OLS regressions with Individual xed eects
Table A.6 : Specications 1-6 from the xed eect OLS regressions on interactions.
43Table A.7 : OLS regressions with Individual xed eects
Table A.7 : Specications 7-12 from the xed eect OLS regressions on interactions.
44Table 6: Table A.8 : Test of the Habituation Hypothesis : regression of unemployment
duration on happiness - Pooled data
Variable All Men Women
Unemployment Duration -0.013 0.012 0.009
t-stat (7.71)  (6.55)  (2.47)y
Constant 8.819 9.079 8.4561
Observations 5498 3547 1951
Table 7: Table A.8 : Test of the Habituation Hypothesis : regression of unemployment
duration on happiness - Panel Data. In
Variable All Men Women
Unemployment Duration 0.006 0.006 0.011
t-stat (-1.66) (-1.44) (-0.96)
Constant 8.971 9.248 8.416
Observations 5498 3547 1951
Table A.8 : OLS regression of unemployment duration and interaction on GHQ12,
POOLED
The eect of duration on happiness is positive, signicant for men, but very small.
Including employment status and demographic controls (age, education, civc status and
health) aects neither the signicance nor the coecients.
Table A.9 : OLS regression of unemployment duration and interaction on GHQ12,
controlling for individual xed eects:
When controlling for individual xed eects, the signicance is gone.
45Table A.9.5: Probit of Search intensity on controls and dierence in happiness.
46Table A.10: Duration OLS regression on dierence of happiness.






























































































































































































































Figure 1: error : Red line is GHQ fell2 points
4950